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Peter Singer

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{{Infobox_Philosopher | region = Western Philosophy | era = Contemporary philosophy, | color = #B0C4DE | image_name = Singer1b-pre.jpg| image_caption = Peter Singer| name = Peter Singer | birth = 1946 | death = | school_tradition = Analytic philosophy | main_interests = Applied ethics, Meta-ethics, Animal liberation| influences = Henry Sidgwick, R. M. Hare | influenced = | notable_ideas = | }} '''Peter Albert David Singer''' (born July 6, 1946 in Melbourne, Victoria (Australia) Victoria, Australia) is an Australian Humanist (belief system) Humanist and philosophy philosopher. As of 2006, he holds two part-time positions: the Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University, and laureate professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne. He specializes in practical ethics, approaching ethical issues from a utilitarianism utilitarian, and specifically a preference utilitarianism preference utilitarian, perspective. Singer's parents were Vienna Viennese Jews who escaped to Australia before World War II in 1938. His father imported tea and coffee, while his mother practiced medicine. Singer studied law, history and philosophy at the University of Melbourne, gaining his degree in 1967. He then received an Master of Arts (postgraduate) MA for a thesis entitled ''Why should I be moral?'' in 1969. He was awarded a scholarship to study at Oxford University, obtaining a Bachelor of Philosophy B.Phil in 1971 with a thesis on civil disobedience, supervised by R. M. Hare, and subsequently published as ''Democracy and Disobedience'' in 1973. After spending two years as a John Radcliffe Radcliffe lecturer at University College, Oxford, he was visiting professor at New York University for 16 months, during which time he produced his second book, ''Animal Liberation (book) Animal Liberation'' (1975). He returned to Melbourne where he has spent most of his career, apart from many visiting positions internationally. Initially, he was a senior lecturer at La Trobe University. Since 1977, he has served as chair of philosophy at Monash University in Melbourne, and founded its Centre for Human Bioethics. In 1996, he ran unsuccessfully as a Australian Greens Green candidate for the Australian Senate. Outside academic circles, he is best known for his book ''Animal Liberation'', widely regarded as the touchstone of the animal liberation movement. He is a founding member of the Great Ape Project, which seeks to persuade the United Nations to adopt a Declaration on Great Apes awarding personhood to non-human Hominidae great apes. In 2004 Singer was recognised as the Australian Humanist (belief system) Humanist of the Year by the Council of Australian Humanist Societies.

Animal liberation
{{Template:Animal liberation movement}} ''Animal Liberation'' (originally publishing published in 1975, second edition 1990, third edition 2002) was a major formative influence on the modern animal rights movement. Although Singer rejects rights as a moral ideal independent from his utilitarianism based on interests, he accepts rights as derived from utilitarian principles, particularly the principle of minimizing suffering. (Compare his fellow utilitarian John Stuart Mill, whose defense of the rights of the individual in On Liberty is introduced with the qualification, "It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility"). Singer allows that animal rights are not coextensive with human rights, writing in ''Animal Liberation'' that "[T]here are obviously important differences between human and other animals, and these differences must give rise to some differences in the rights that each have." But he is no more skeptical of animal rights than of the rights of women, beginning Animal Liberation by defending just such a comparison against Mary Wollstonecraft Mary Wollstonecraft's 18th-century critic Thomas Taylor, who argued that if Wollstonecraft's reasoning in defense of women's rights were correct, then "brutes" would have rights too. Taylor thought he had revealed a reductio ad absurdum of Wollstonecraft's view; Singer regards it as a sound logical implication. Taylor's modus tollens is Singer's modus ponens. In ''Animal Liberation'', Singer argues against what he calls speciesism: discrimination on the grounds that a being belongs to a certain species. He holds the interests of all beings capable of suffering to be worthy of equal consideration of interests equal consideration, and that giving lesser consideration to beings based on their having wings or fur is no more justified than discrimination based on skin color. In particular, he argues that while animals show lower intelligence than the average human, many severely retarded humans show equally diminished mental capacity, and intelligence therefore does not provide a basis for providing nonhuman animals any less consideration than such retarded humans. He concludes that the use of animals for food is unjustifiable because it creates unnecessary suffering, and considers veganism the most fully justifiable diet. Singer also condemns most vivisection, though he believes a few animal experiments may be acceptable if the benefit (in terms of improved medical treatment, etc.) outweighs the harm done to the animals used. Due to the subjectivity of the term "benefit", controversy exists about this and other utilitarian views. But he is clear enough that humans of comparable sentience should also be candidates for any animal experimentation that passes the benefit test. So a monkey and a human infant would be equally available for the experiment, from a moral point of view, other things being equal. If performing the experiment on the infant isn't justifiable, then Singer believes that the experiment shouldn't happen at all -- instead, the researchers should pursue their goals using computer simulations or other methods. Acceptable vivisection would be weakly "speciesist" insofar as it passes over human candidates for non-human subjects, but arguably species membership in such cases would be a legitimate tie-breaking consideration.

Applied ethics
His most comprehensive work, ''Practical Ethics'' (1979, second edition 1993), analyses in detail why and how beings' interests should be weighed. His principle of equality encompasses all beings with interests, and it requires equal consideration of those interests, whatever the species. The principle of equal consideration of interests does not dictate equal treatment of all those with interests, since different interests warrant different treatment. All have an interest in avoiding pain, for instance, but relatively few have an interest in cultivating their abilities. Not only does his principle justify different treatment for different interests, but it allows different treatment for the same interest when diminishing marginal utility is a factor, favoring (say) a starving person's interest in food over the same interest of someone who is only slightly hungry. Among the more important human interests are those in avoiding pain, in developing one's abilities, in satisfying basic needs for food and shelter, in enjoying warm personal relationships, in being free to pursue one's projects without interference, "and many others". The fundamental interest that entitles a being to equal consideration is the capacity for "suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness"; mice as well as human beings have this interest, but stones and trees do not. He holds that a being's interests should always be weighed according to that being's concrete properties, and not according to its belonging to some abstract group such as a species, or a set of possible beings, or an early stage of something with an as yet unactualized potential. He favors a 'journey' model of life, which measures the wrongness of taking a life by the degree to which doing so frustrates a life journey's goals. So taking a life is less wrong at the beginning, when no goals have been set, and at the end, when the goals have either been met or are unlikely to be accomplished. The journey model is tolerant of some frustrated desire, explains why persons who have embarked on their journeys are not replaceable, and accounts for why it is wrong to bring a miserable life into existence. Although sentience puts a being within the sphere of equal consideration of interests, only a personal interest in continuing to live brings the journey model into play. This model also explains the priority that Singer attaches to ''interests'' over trivial desires and pleasures. For instance, one has an interest in food, but not in the pleasures of the palate that might distinguish eating steak from eating tofu, because nutrition is instrumental to many goals in one's life journey, whereas the desire for meat is not and is therefore trumped by the interest of animals in avoiding the miseries of factory farming. In order to avoid bias towards human interests, he requires the idea of an impartial standpoint from which to compare interests. This is an elaboration of the familiar idea of putting oneself in the other's shoes, adjusted for beings with paws or flippers. He has wavered about whether the precise aim is the total amount of satisfied interests, or instead the most satisfied interests among those beings who already exist prior to the decision one is making. Both have liabilities. The total view, for instance, seems to lead to Derek Parfit Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion -- that is, it seems to imply that it's morally better to have an enormous population with lives barely worth living rather than a smaller population with much happier lives. The prior-existence view, on the other hand, seems questionably indifferent to the harm or benefit one can do to those who are brought into existence by one's decisions. The second edition of ''Practical Ethics'' disavows the first edition's suggestion that the total and prior-existence views should be combined in such a way that the total view applies to sentient beings who are not self-conscious and the prior-existence view applies to those who are. This would mean that rats and human infants are replaceable -- their painless death is permissible as long as they are replaced -- whereas human adults and other persons in Singer's expanded sense, including great apes, are not replaceable. The second edition dispenses with the requirement of replacement and the consequent high population numbers for sentient beings. It asserts that preference-satisfaction utilitarianism, incorporating the 'journey' model, applies without invoking the first edition's suggestion about the total view. But the details are fuzzy and Singer admits that he is "not entirely satisfied" with his treatment of choices that involve bringing beings into existence. His revised position would presumably be in accord with PETA PETA's opposition to no-kill sheltering (when this causes animals to live in deplorable conditions) and its advocacy of neutering, both policies contrary to the implications of the total view, at least when the animals have (or would have if conceived) lives worth living. Ethical conduct is justifiable by reasons that go beyond prudence to "something bigger than the individual," addressing a larger audience. Singer thinks this going-beyond identifies moral reasons as "somehow universal", specifically in the injunction to 'love thy neighbor as thyself', interpreted by him as demanding that one give the same weight to the interests of others as one gives to one's own interests. This universalizing step, which Singer traces from Immanuel Kant Kant to Hare, is crucial and sets him apart from moral theorists from Thomas Hobbes Hobbes to David Gauthier, who regard that step as flatly irrational. Universalization leads directly to utilitarianism, Singer argues, on the strength of the thought that my own interests cannot count for more than the interests of others. Taking these into account, one must weigh them up and adopt the course of action that is most likely to maximize the interests of those affected; utilitarianism has been arrived at. Singer's universalizing step applies to interests without reference to who has them, whereas a kantian's applies to the judgments of rational agents (in Kant's kingdom of ends, or Rawls Rawls's Original Position, etc.). Singer regards kantian universalization as unjust to animals. It's their capacity for suffering/happiness that matters morally, not their deficiency with respect to rational judgment. As for the hobbesians, Singer attempts a response in the final chapter of ''Practical Ethics'', arguing that self-interested reasons support adoption of the moral point of view, such as 'the paradox of hedonism', which counsels that happiness is best found by not looking for it, and the need most people feel to relate to something larger than their own concerns.

Abortion, euthanasia and infanticide
Consistent with his general ethical theory, Singer holds that the right to physical integrity is grounded in a being's ability to suffer, and the right to life is grounded in, among other things, the ability to plan and anticipate one's future. Since the unborn, infants and severely disabled people lack the latter (but not the former) ability, he states that abortion, painless infanticide and euthanasia can be justified in certain special circumstances, for instance in the case of severely disabled infants whose life would cause suffering both to themselves and to their parents. In his view the central argument against abortion is ''It is wrong to kill an innocent human being; a human fetus is an innocent human being; therefore it is wrong to kill a human fetus''. He challenges the first premise, on the grounds that its reference to human beings is ambiguous as between human beings in the zoological sense and persons as rational and self-conscious. There is no sanctity of human life that confers moral protection on human beings in the zoological sense. Until the capacity for pain develops after "18 weeks of gestation", abortion terminates an existence that has no intrinsic value (as opposed to the value it might have in virtue of being valued by the parents or others). As it develops the features of a person, it has moral protections that are comparable to those that should be extended to nonhuman life as well. He also rejects a backup argument against abortion that appeals to potential: ''It is wrong to kill a potential human being; a human fetus is a potential human being; therefore it is wrong to kill a human fetus.'' The second premise is stronger, but its first premise is weaker, for he denies that a potential X has the same value or moral rights as an X. Against those who stress the continuity of our existence from conception to adulthood, he poses the example of an embryo in a dish on a laboratory bench, which he calls Mary. Now if it divides into two identical embryos, there is no way to answer the question whether Mary dies, or continues to exist, or is replaced by Jane and Susan. These are absurd questions, he thinks, and their absurdity casts doubt on the view that the embryo is a human being in the morally significant sense. Singer classifies euthanasia as voluntary, involuntary, or non-voluntary. (For possible similar historical definitions of euthanasia see Karl Binding, Alfred Hoche and Werner Catel.) Given his consequentialist approach, the difference between active and passive euthanasia is not morally significant, for the required act/omission doctrine is untenable; killing and letting die are on a moral par when their consequences are the same. Voluntary euthanasia, undertaken with the consent of the subject, is supported by the autonomy of persons and their freedom to waive their rights, especially against a legal background such as the guidelines developed by the courts in the Netherlands. Non-voluntary euthanasia at the beginning or end of life's journey, when the capacity to reason about what is at stake is undeveloped or lost, is justified when swift and painless killing is the only alternative to suffering for the subject.

World poverty
In "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", one of Singer's best-known philosophical essays, he argues that the injustice of some people living in abundance while others starve is morally indefensible. Singer proposes that anyone able to help the poor should donate part of their income to aid poverty and similar efforts. Singer reasons that, when one is already living comfortably, a further purchase to increase comfort will lack the same moral importance as saving another person's life. Singer himself donates 20% of his salary to Oxfam and UNICEF. In "Rich and Poor", the version of the aforementioned article that appears in the second edition of ''Practical Ethics'', his main argument is presented as follows: ''If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable significance, we ought to do it; absolute poverty is bad; there is some poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance; therefore we ought to prevent some absolute poverty.'' The crucial notion of comparability here assumes an objective point of view, which is sometimes characterized as "the view from nowhere." It is plain that this point of view can't be sustained continuously against the urgency of the subjective point of view of a human being coping with life's mundane necessities. (Singer's own life demonstrates this, as he acknowledges.) The question is whether the tension between objective and subjective viewpoints provides a source of mere excuses for murder, or whether instead the subjective point of view draws on sources of importance that have to be balanced against the objective point of view. If the latter, we may not be murderers. That depends on the correct resolution of the tension between viewpoints. Such resolution can't be established from the objective, golden-rule perspective, because ''arguendo'' that standpoint is challenged by the claims of subjectivity. Libertarianism, for instance, is one of these claims, holding that we are within our rights to reject the conclusion of Singer's argument, even if we should be motivated by charity to comply with it. In this case we are not murderers, from a subjective viewpoint, even if we are murderers, from an objective standpoint. Thomas Nagel suggests, in his essay "The Fragmentation of Value", that there is no alternative at this point to relying on the good judgment of practically wise people. Singer admits that to discharge our duty completely would require "a degree of moral heroism," but this provides only an excuse for murder. Arguments like Nagel's make things worse by offering a rationale for complacency and inaction.

Other views
Zoophilia: in a 2001 review of Midas Dekkers' ''Dearest Pet: On Bestiality''[http://www.nerve.com/Opinions/Singer/heavyPetting/main.asp], Singer stated that "mutually satisfying activities" of a sexual nature may sometimes occur between humans and animals and that writer Otto Soyka would condone such activities. Singer states that Dekkers believes that Zoophilia should remain illegal if it involves what he sees as "cruelty", but otherwise is no cause for shock or horror. Singer believes that although sex between species is not normal or natural, it does not constitute a transgression of our status as human beings, because human beings are animals or, more specifically, we are great apes. Religious groups, animal rights groups, and others have condemned this view, while animal rights organization PETA has supported them [http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/09/arts/09TANK.html]. Immigration: Singer holds that affluent nations have a duty to greatly increase their refugee intake. He suggests that such nations begin a yearly doubling of refugee quotas until immigration has reached a level where it is clear that further immigration will, on the whole, do more harm than good. The natural environment environment: As the natural world is not sentient, Singer claims it has no intrinsic value. However, he says that the value to present and future sentient beings of maintaining the environment is so high that people and their governments should make drastic changes to their way of life to ensure the world's preservation. Evolutionary psychology and leftist politics: In ''A Darwinian Left'', Singer outlines a plan for the leftism polititical left to adapt to the lessons of Darwinism and evolutionary psychology. He says that evolutionary psychology suggests that humans naturally tend to be self-interested, and that leftists can't ignore scientific fact simply because it's unpleasant or inconvenient for achieving their political goals. He further argues that the evidence that selfish tendencies are natural must not be taken as evidence that selfishness is right. He concludes that game theory (the mathematical study of strategy) and experiments in psychology offer hope that self-interested people will make short-term sacrifices for the good of others, if society provides the right conditions. Essentially Singer claims that although humans possess selfish, competitive tendencies naturally, they have a substantial capacity for cooperation that has also been selected for by evolution. It's the job of the Left, he says, to create those conditions which foster cooperation amongst members of society.

Criticism
Singer's positions have been attacked by many different groups concerned with what they see as an attack upon human dignity, from advocates for disabled people to religious groups, including right-to-life supporters. Critics argue that Singer is in no position to judge the quality of life of disabled people. In Germany, his position has been compared to the Nazism Nazi practice of murdering "unworthy life", and his lectures have been repeatedly disrupted. Some claim that Singer's utilitarian ideas lead to eugenics. Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal wrote to organizers of a Swedish book fair to which Singer was invited that "A professor of morals ... who justifies the right to kill handicapped newborns ... is in my opinion unacceptable for representation at your level."[http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/feder102898.asp] Singer's conclusions in controversial areas such as abortion, infanticide and euthanasia may help explain why his works have attracted particular attention. Some commentators, such as the Wall Street Journal, expressed their disapproval[http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=85000772] at the publication of Singer's essay, "[http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/2001----.htm Heavy Petting]," in which he frankly discusses bestiality as a logical conclusion to some of the arguments he has made with respect to the relationship of humans to animals. Proponents of other ethical systems like deontology or virtue ethics have found in Singer's work ammunition against utilitarianism and its consequentialism (that is, its assumption that the morality of an act is to be evaluated according to its consequences). They claim that his conclusions show that utilitarianism may lead to eugenics, infanticide, or even justification of torture{{fact}} in certain circumstances. Singer has replied that many people judge him based on secondhand summaries and short quotations taken out of context, not his books or articles. (To make his writings more accessible, Singer has collated the most important into a single book, ''Writings on an Ethical Life''.) For example, when people hear that Singer thinks that a dog has the same moral importance as a newborn baby, they might interpret the statement as dehumanising, because of the low value traditionally placed on the interests of animals. However, although Singer does not regard the newborn child as deserving the same degree of consideration as an adult, he regards animals as deserving a much higher degree of consideration than they have traditionally been given. Singer experienced the complexities of some of these questions in his own life. Singer's mother had Alzheimers disease Alzheimer's disease, which rendered her, in Singer's system, a "nonperson". He did not euthanise her, saying, "I think this has made me see how the issues of someone with these kinds of problems are really very difficult". In an interview with Ronald Bailey he explained that he is not the only person who is involved in making decisions about his mother (he has a sister). He did say that if he were solely responsible, his mother might not be alive today. (She has since died.) This incident has led to accusations of hypocrisy. However, Singer has never argued that a non-person who is not suffering ''has'' to be euthanised - only that it could be ''morally acceptable'' to euthanise.

Meta-ethics and foundational issues
Though Singer focuses more than many philosophers on applied ethical questions, he has also written in depth on foundational issues in meta-ethics, including why one ethical system should be chosen over others. In ''The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology'', he argues that that the evolution of human society provides support for the utilitarian point of view. On his account, ethical reasoning has existed from the time primitive foraging bands had to cooperate, compromise, and make group decisions to survive. He elaborates: "In a dispute between members of a cohesive group of reasoning beings, the demand for a reason is a demand for a justification that can be accepted by the group as a whole." Thus, consideration of others' interests has long been a necessary part of the human experience. Singer believes that contemplative analysis may now guide one to accept a broader utilitarianism: :If I have seen that from an ethical point of view I am just one person among the many in my society, and my interests are no more important, from the point of view of the whole, than the similar interests of others within my society, I am ready to see that, from a still larger point of view, my society is just one among other societies, and the interests of members of my society are no more important, from that larger perspective, than the similar interests of members of other societies… Taking the impartial element in ethical reasoning to its logical conclusion means, first, accepting that we ought to have equal concern for all human beings. Singer elaborates that viewing oneself as equal to others in one's society and at the same time viewing one's society as fundamentally superior to other societies may cause an uncomfortable cognitive dissonance. This is the sense in which he means that reason may push people to accept a broader utilitarian stance. Critics (e.g. Binmore 2005) point out that this cognitive dissonance is apparently not very strong, since people often knowingly ignore the interests of faraway societies quite similar to their own. They also argue that the "ought" of the quoted paragraph applies only to someone who has already accepted the premise that all socities are equally important. Singer has responded that his argument in ''Expanding the Circle'' wasn't intended to provide a complete philosophical justification for a utilitarian categorical imperative, but merely to provide a plausible explanation for how some people come to accept utilitarianism. An alternative line taken by Singer about the need for ethics (for example in the last chapter of ''Practical Ethics'') is that living the ethical life may be, on the whole, more satisfying than seeking only material gain. He invokes the hedonistic paradox, noting that those who pursue material gain seldom find the happiness they seek. Having a broader purpose in life may lead to more long-term happiness. On this account, impartial (self-sacrificing) behavior in particular matters may be motivated by self-interested considerations from a broader perspective. This argument does not justify utilitarianism in particular as opposed to other ethical philosophies; instead, it defends the need for ethics in general. Singer has also implicitly argued that a watertight defense of utilitarianism is not crucial to his work. In "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", he begins by saying that he would like to see how far a seemingly innocuous and widely endorsed principle can take us; the principle is that one is morally required to forego a small pleasure to relieve someone else's immense pain. He then argues that this principle entails radical conclusions – for example, that most Americans are extremely immoral for not giving up some luxury goods in order to donate the money for famine relief. If his reasoning is valid, either it is not immoral to value small luxuries over saving many lives, or many Americans are very immoral. From this perspective, regardless of the soundness of Singer's fundamental defense of utilitarianism, his work has value in that it exposes conflicts between many people's stated beliefs and their actions.

See also
*Animal Liberation Front *Animal Liberation Front Supporters Group *Animal rights *Animal testing *Steven Best *Stephen Clark *Joseph Fletcher *GANDALF trial *Volkert van der Graaf *R. M. Hare *Barry Horne *People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals *Tom Regan *Richard D. Ryder *Henry Spira *Utilitarian Bioethics *Utilitarianism *Veganism *Vegetarianism *Vivisection

Publications
His other publications include: * ''The President of Good & Evil, the Ethics of George W. Bush'', 2004 * ''Pushing Time Away : My Grandfather and the Tragedy of Jewish Vienna'', 2003 * ''Interview, Penthouse Magazine, July 2003'' * ''One World: The Ethics of Globalization'', 2002 * ''Rethinking Life and Death : The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics'', 1996 * ''How Are We to Live?: Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest'', 1995 * ''Should the Baby Live?'', 1985

References
* Ken Binmore, ''Natural Justice'', Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005. [ISBN 0195178114] * James Franklin, ''Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia'', Sydney: Macleay Press, 2003. [ISBN 1876492082] ch. 16 * Peter Singer, ''The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology'', New York : Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1981. [ISBN 0374151121] * Peter Singer, ''Animal Liberation'', 2nd edition, New York: Avon, 1990. [ISBN 0060011572] * Peter Singer, ''Practical Ethics'', 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. [ISBN 052143971X] * Peter Singer, ''How Are We to Live? : ethics in an age of self-interest'', Prometheus Books, 1995. [ISBN 0879759666] * Peter Singer, ''A Darwinian Left'', New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999. [ISBN 0300083238] * Peter Singer, ''Writings on an Ethical Life'', New York: Ecco, 2000. [ISBN 0060007443] * Peter Singer, ''Marx: A Very Short Introduction''. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001. [ISBN 0192854054] * Peter Singer, ''The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics of George Bush'', New York: Granta, 2004. [ISBN 0525948139]

External links

- Peter Singer's website.
- Peter Singer. Resources on Singer, including book excerpts, articles, interviews, reviews and writings about him.
- Peter Singer biography

Criticism

- Bless Peter Singer – criticism by Rabbi Avi Shafran
- The Worth of Human Life is Unquestionable - rebuttal to Singer's views
- Wall Street Journal attacks animal rights advocate Peter Singer
- Statement of Marca Bistro, chairperson, National council on disability: regarding the hiring of Peter Singer
- Against the Philosophy of Peter Singer – from the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF) Category:1946 births Singer, Peter Category:Living people Singer, Peter Category:20th century philosophers Singer, Peter Category:21st century philosophers Singer, Peter Category:Animal liberation movement Singer, Peter Category:Atheist philosophers Singer, Peter Category:Australian philosophers Singer, Peter Category:Ethics Singer, Peter Category:Former students of University College, Oxford Singer, Peter Category:Green politicians Singer, Peter Category:Pro-choice politicians Singer, Peter Category:Humanists Singer, Peter Category:Utilitarians Singer, Peter Category:Vegetarians Singer, Peter Category:Socialists Singer, Peter de:Peter Singer es:Peter Singer fr:Peter Singer it:Peter Singer ja:ピーター・シンガー no:Peter Singer pl:Peter Singer pt:Peter Singer sk:Peter Singer fi:Peter Singer sv:Peter Singer

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